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1: INTRODUCTION 
There is considerable debate about the meaning of "19921' and 
its potential impact on business and competitive behaviour 
across Europe. Some perhaps imagine that it wili be a 
signal event heralding wholesale change throughout the 
European business structure. 
another piece of "Eurocracy" 
Others may dismiss it as yet 
dustbins of time. 
destined to disappear in the 
On balance the latter group (the cynics) 
are perhaps outnumbered but nevertheless the issues of just 
how business attitudes and behaviour might change and evolve 
are not necessarily very obvious. In addition to this 
contemporary concern with the impact of the 1992 directives 
there is a longer standing concern among academics as to the 
nature of industry evolution, its prime causes, the 
mechanisms, and its unfolding over time. There is 
developing a concern with business history, with structural 
change, and with the strategic consequences. 
The food processing indsutry in Europe appears to be one of 
those industries with a European structure permissive of 
change or evolution as well as one whose fundamental 
conditions might be changed by the 1992 directives. This 
research study is intended to assess the nature of the 
industry across Europe, its internal dynamics, and in 
particular the ways in which the.1992 directives might shape 
its future development. 
This particular paper represents an interim report in which 
we present some of the issues concerning industry evolution, 
their general applicability to the food processing industry, 
together with an initial review of the industry and its . 
apparent growth trajectories. The data presented here is 
largely UK in origin and cross sectional in character. The 
next stages of the work will extend to the other EC 
countries and be more dynamic in character. Section 2 
discusses the evolution of the food industry, and section 3 
looks at the current industry structure and its 
implications. 
2: LONG TERM DEVELOPMENT 
Porter's (1980) popularisation of the competitive strategy 
framework laid some emphasis on the evolution of industries 
and the triggers behind such long term shifts. This, 
however, has been a relatively neglected issue both in the 
academic and more practitioner-based writings. Porter 
correctly emphasised the need for a dynamic analysis of 
industries but it has been that static analysis of industry 
structure that has received most attention. The long term 
development and evolutionary paths of industries and markets 
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can and have been chronicled historically but not much 
attention has been paid to the linked activities of triggers 
of change, strategic moves and positioning, and the tactical 
exploitation of the newly developed positions. 
analysis can by itself fail to read fundamental 
Static 
shifts - 
these occurring on time horizons too long to allow 
discernment over the shorter period. It can therefore 
confuse the tactical development and exploitation of 
competitive position with longer term strategic thinking. 
The essence of strategy (following Rumelt [1974]) is the 
creation of idiosyncratic assets protectable from short term 
imitation by competitors. 
time in the making. 
Such asset creation is a long 
The conception, the planning, the 
implementation are typically expensive, irreversible without 
non-trivial cost, and time consuming. Subsequent 
exploitation of these assets may call for competitive re- 
positioning from time to time, and certainly requires an 
elaborate tactical paraphernalia in which the investment is 
also non-trivial. Such exploitation is, however, contingent 
on the underlying idiosyncratic assets and on their 
appropriateness over the long term development of the market 
place. Where the asset position becomes progressively 
inappropriate it is common to see substantial efforts over 
the short period to extract further rents - i.e. the tactics 
take the strain. It is also common to observe various forms 
of re-positioning activity masquerading under the heading of 
strategic change - these represent at best minor 
refurbishments of the outworn asset base. 
Any analysis of industry structure and the interplay between 
competitors requires a careful understanding of the 
evolutionary path of the industry in question. Where, in 
particular, we see (by common consent) some far reaching 
changes in the terms and conditions of trade (such as the 
completion of the internal market in Europe) coupled with . 
high market growth rates and shifts in the nature of markets 
then we might look for shifts in the underlying industry 
conditions. Our argument is that the food processing 
industry can be seen to have passed through a number of 
phases each with its own particular characteristics calling 
forth different business concepts and allocation of 
resources. Thus the industry has seen a period of 
wholesaler domination (see Kaldor [1980]), followed by 
manufacturers' domination in the sixties - the period of the 
scale economy brander (see Foy [19801), then the rise of the 
retailer in the seventies (see Segal-Horn and McGee [19871), 
to be followed it is said by a new era in which the consumer 
is expected to be king. This section looks at these periods 
(excluding the pre-war wholesaler period) with a view to 
establishing the underlying changes associated with the 
current period leading up to the completion of the internal 
market in Europe.The changes in prospect will be determined 
by these fundamental shifts and should not be confused with 
the welter of shorter term competitive positioning and 
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tactical adjustments which are inevitably the greater as 
players in the markets strive for short term adjustments to 
cope with imperfectly perceived shifts which are longer term 
and more fundamental in character. 
2 . 1 Th-~~~~~-E~~~o.~y~.ran.der. 
The consumer packaged goods industries (including the food 
processing industry) enjoyed halcyon days in the sixties 
(Foy identifies the period as 1960-74) when manufacturers 
were dominant. This was a period when mass markets in 
processed foods were growing quickly, retail distribution 
was highly fragmented, economies of scale were avsilable, 
and processing technologies were proprietary. These 
substantial economic advantages were buttressed by the 
creation of mass marketing systems comprising national media 
advertising, national sales forces, and increasingly 
sophisticated marketing support services. The visible 
output of this business system was the brand, the repository 
of guarantees to the customer of product qualities arising 
from proprietary technology. The creation of the brand was 
subject to many economies of marketing scale, and fostered 
scale economies available elsewhere in the system. The 
brand was the visible symbol of the manufacturers' strength, 
and was the visible barrier to entry behind which grew a 
series of oligopolies earning monopoly rents. Foy (1980) 
described seven competitive (entry) barriers around the 
brand in the 1960s. 
1. National sales force and distribution : "filling up 
the backroom and stealing shelf space"; 
2. Listing muscle : fragmented retailers felt they had to 
stock the leading brands on manufacturers terms; 
3. Intensive media advertising bought at preferential 
rates and defrayed across large volumes; 
4. Superior product quality arising from proprietary 
processing technology and/or from consumer perceptions; 
5. Low cost processing either from superior technology or 
from scale economies; 
6. Sophisticated support servicbs e.g. market research, 
product management support structure, advertising skills; 
7. Discounts on raw material purchases based on volume. 
Branding economics was all about the premium prices, the 
consumer pull, and economies of scale. The association of 
market share and profitability was well attested in this 
regime of the scale economy brander. Behind the brand lay a 
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technology edge and a new management structure and style - 
the style of the marketing company. 
2 . 2 T~~_~~eof~~__Reta.~l..~.r 
The heyday of the scale economy brander (the late 60s) was, 
however, 
evident. 
a period in which the seeds of change were already 
The large retailer was becoming more and more 
significant in the market. His position was fostered by the 
abolition of Retail Price Maintenance in 1964 allowing 
retailers the opportunity to compete on price. Furthermore 
processing technology was diffusing and becoming less 
proprietary. Quite suddenly the balance of power shifted 
from the manufacturer to the retailer, just as in the 1930s 
it had shifted from the wholesaler to the manufacturer. The 
emergence of large scale national retailers made for 
dramatic change. The consumer was now faced with a new 
proposition. Price-led competition was supported by an 
outlet brand (as distinct from a product brand). This was 
furthered by the entry of smaller scale processors who could 
now find ready customers in the private label retailers and 
whose access to technology and to efficient plant was not 
deterred by proprietary technology. In addition retailers 
began to reorganise the inward logistics of their business 
thereby diluting the distribution economies of the major 
manufacturers and making it possible for further specialised 
new entry. The emergence of national accounts diluted also 
the national sales forces of processors and undermined their 
product management structure. 
The scale economy branders found their entry barriers 
substantially undermined (or hurdled?). Many of their 
significant overhead costs (sales force, distribution 
network, support services) were less directly useful, and 
were defrayed over lower volumes; their product brands were * 
challenged by retailer brands, their product quality was 
less obviously pre-eminent; manufacturing had not only 
suffered from neglect in marketing oriented companies but 
its technologies and procedures could be effectively copied 
in smaller plants; and to cap it all retailers were 
increasingly demanding and obtaining quantity discounts 
which they used to further price competition, not only 
reducing manufacturers' margins directly but indirectly 
eroding their brands by fostering price competition. (Table 
1)' 
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Table 1 ~~uep_fi-_Sp_e_c_ia1.termS~-gegotiated ..wit.h 
retailersas-apercentage--of--t_qtals.ales . .._ (wL?831 
Product Sales to top Own label Special terms 
10 customers sales (8) 
(8) (%) To all To top 
10 
Baked beans 
Biscuits 
Bread 
Flour confect. 
Canned beer 
Cigarettes 
Paint 
Toothpaste 
Paper tissues 
40-65 
45 
45 
50 
c.34 
z': 
50 
70 
21 6.8 7.5 
17 10.6 12.4 
20 Not disclosed 
21 6.7 8.0 
2 9.4 12.8 
Very small 1.8 3.7 
10 Not disclosed 
5 8.1 9.1 
23 11.2 n.d. 
Source: OFT (1985, pp. 44-54), Grant 1987, p.50. 
This story is familiar. There was considerable variance 
across sectors within food processing. In some instances 
the brand has been well protected - the entry barriers have 
held up well (e.g. breakfast cereals). The point of the 
story is this. There are t&gsers fo_r change. These 
provoke major strategic shifts. These strategy changes are 
promoted by a series of (new) tactical moves. They are 
resisted by incumbents by a series of ripostes essentially 
tactical in nature, often moving from a reiteration of 
familiar tactics Lhrough a realisation of the nature of 
changed circumstances to major strategic shifts by the 
incumbents themselves. 
In this case the triggers were partly evolutionary and 
partly exogenous in nature. The evolution was that of 
supermarkets, the possibility of economies of scale in 
retailing and its implications for price competition in 
distribution - a new possibility. This was fostered by the 
abolition of RPM an event which ushered in the new era 
although it is noteworthy that it took some ten years* for 
its full weight to be appreciated. In addition to the 
active forces for change there is the erosion of position to 
take into account. Distinctive competitive advantage erodes 
as competitors learn and as knowledge diffuses. Even 
without exogenous forces for change the internal dynamics of 
* Around 1974 both Sainsbury and Tesco began their drive to 
become national retailers. 
change will force realignment and evening-out of competitive 
position. 
The strategic than 
the 
Lges were evidenced by the retailers and by 
new entrants i 
the 
nto food processing. 
concentration 
The major change was 
and larger outlets 
of retailing as the majors built larger 
stea _ _ 
concentrated on price competition and ,dily widened their businesses to include distribukion 
branding, research (a little) and development (much more): 
and wider and wider product ranges. The retail trade was 
able to turn brands into commodities, to brand themselves 
rather than their products, and was able to gain very 
substantial efficiencies. Strategic change in retailing was 
bound to have very substantial effects on the strategic 
position of manufacturers. 
The secondary strategic change arose from the erosion of the 
"edge" of manufacturers. New, smaller entrants were 
increasingly able to perform many of the same functions. 
The interlopers essentially cherry-picked the vertically 
integrated processors. This vertical integration was 
originally an entry barrier by virtue of the capital 
requirements implied. It became a strategic disadvantage 
because of the high costs of each of its component parts 
each of which was facing vigorous and progressively more 
efficient competition. 
In general, the reaction of incumbent processors divides 
into three stages. First is the increased emphasis on 
familiar marketing tactics to re-assert the brand and its 
power with the consumer. Second, comes the cost cutting as 
the high fixed cost base becomes more and more embarrassing. 
Shortly after comes the first attempts at re-positioning 
with new product development, product range extensions, 
revisions, and trimming. Eventually may come more 
fundamental attempts to re-define the business in the new 
circumstances of the industry. 
2. 3 The Europaan-~D~mens.~ol. 
If the period from 1960-74 showed manufacturer dominance, 
and 1974-1986 represented the power of the large retailer, 
then what are we to make of 1987 onwards? The fall of 
manufacturers' brands was triggered by structural change in 
retailing along with other shifts within the manufacturing 
value chain. Triggers of change are usually single dramatic 
events. However, in practice major changes spring from 
small seeds and gather momentum overtime. The flowering of 
the new is parallelled initially by apparent prosperity of 
the old, as indeed was the case in the 1960s when 
manufacturers were prosperous but retailers were gathering 
strength. Other industries show similar patterns (see 
Ghazanfar [1985] on reprographics and Jones Cl9861 on 
automobiles). Changes in industry structure divide into two 
6 
L 
broad patte  
4 
the continuous and therefore predictable and 
expected, an 'the discontinuous (see Ansoff (19651). 
D iscontinuity can arise from an expected change proving 
unexpectedly powerful and all embracing - a  shift in the 
pace of change. It can also arise from totally unexpected 
events such as legislation, new discoveries and so on. Very 
often ma jor discontinuity is fostered by a conjunction of 
these effects, thus in the 1960s the shift came out from 
legislation (RPM abolished), accelerating power of retailers 
(fostered by the abolition of RPM), and the natural forces 
of knowledge and skill w ithin the manufacturing sector. 
In looking forward to the 199Os, therefore, we should be 
seeking a conjunction of exogenous,and endogenous forces, 
and the links between independent events and those events 
consequential on the independent. The projected completion 
of the internal market in 1992 is an independent event 
exogenous to the industry capable in principle o f 
transforming the playing field and the rules of the game 
(MAC (19871). The intent is to proceed towards a common 
market in which goods, people, services, and capital can 
move without Obstacle, just as envisaged in the T reaty of 
Rome 30 years ago. The essence of the C0mmissi0n's 
initiative was some 300 measures (about 20 of which have 
been dropped) to be adopted as directives (European laws) by 
the 8ndS of the present commissi.on's reign in December 1992. 
These directives focus on practical measures such as 
labelling requirements and inspection procedures rather than 
on statements of principle. The challenge for companies is 
to respond in operational terms to th8Se specific changes 
rather than undertake political lobbying procedures designed 
to protect them from the practical applications of general 
pL*inslples. The graspable notion is that the conditions of * 
the market and of competition w ill change. The imponderable 
is how much and Where it w ill all lead. As the Economist 
(1988) observed: 
"part o f the power of 1992 is that IZ is so hard to 
reduce to essentials . . . 1992 has b8COm8 a state of 
m ind, a  set o f expectations that has political force, 
an obsession that amounts almost to a  new reality." 
Existing EC food law defines detailed requirements on the 
composit ion of specific foodstuffs. These have proved 
difficult to agree, are quite complicated and are full o f 
numerous national exceptions (derogations). There are no 
plans for extending these directives on food Composition 
further. Instead the proposed legislation W ill Concentrate 
on a more informative system of food labelling and on 
setting general food safety and hygiene standards. 
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Appendix A-lists the coverage of the four "fram8WOrk" 
directives together with other measures under consideration 
(from DTI 1988). The first of these removes the scope for 
national derogations from EC rules. 
example, 
This might mean, for 
drinks in 
that the restriction on using aspartame in soft 
France may be disallowed. The second concerns the 
criteria for evaluating and labelling food additives. This might affect, for example, the German beer purity law which 
stipulates that beer containing substances other than hops, 
malted barley, yeast, and water cannot be sold in Germany. 
The third directive concerns materials and articles in 
contact with food. The fourth covers harmonisation of food 
labelling requirements by ending the national exceptions. 
According to the MAC report (1987): 
"nearly every EEC country operates with different label 
requirements, which implies that an EEC producer is 
effectively prohibited from using a uniform label for 
its EEC sales. The amount of information required on 
th8 label varies from country to country . . . Exhaustive 
requirements like this . . . form a subtle but effective 
barrier to trade." 
At first sight th8S8 may Seem to be unpromising triggers for 
major change. The MAC report examined trade barriers in ten 
product sectors identifying over 200 barriers (not all of 
which would be subject to removal by the new directives). 
MAC estimate that the quantifiable direct benefits of 
removing th8S8 barriers are themselves significant amounting 
to 2 - 3% of industry value added. But they go on to say 
that the indirect net benefits would be larger. These would 
be: 
1. the broadening of consumer choice; . 
2. a significant increase in trade; 
3. efficiency gains; 
4. improvement in the competitiveness of EEC food 
companies vis-a-vis the rest of the world. 
Any estimate of the indirect benefits is necessarily 
controversial. MAC estimate that there would be moderate to 
large increases in imports (i.e. in intra-EEC trade). In 
particular the beer market in West Germany and the pasta 
market in Italy could see imports rising from negligible 
levels to 3-S% of domestic consumption. The German beer 
industry also shows striking potential for industry 
restructuring. There are (MAC 1987) currently about 1200 
breweries in Germany accounting for 75% of all breweries in 
the EEC. Some closures are already taking place. 
a 
The MAC report concludes: 
"The existence of trade barriers . . . has served to 
protect potentially weak domestic companies, and 
inversely, has encouraged strong companies to expand 
domestically rather than attempt cross-border 
expansion. These features of trade barriers have 
reinforced the relative fragmentation of the EEC food 
industry. Removal of these barriers should decrease or 
eliminate these tendencies". 
While these and other estimates of the benefits are high, 
they are cumulative, long term, 
just a few product sectors. 
and are extrapolated from 
Reverting to the views 
articulated in the Economist, the tangible opportunities 
from the four directives are immediate but not necessarily 
impressive in the short term. Their longer term impact will 
be viewed against the opportunities offered in the markets 
Of Europe, in particular the potential for serving 
homogeneous consumer Segments across Europe. 
Riesenbeck (1988) argues that (1) national markets are 
becoming saturated and life cycles of competitive advantages 
are shortening forcing companies.to segment more finely and 
concentrate on acceleration of new product development, (2) 
there is an increasingly international orientation of 
consumers and a growing homogeneity of demand around the 
world, (3) the importance of international sourcing is 
rising, and (4) that entry and exist barriers have been 
reduced as the level of fixed assets required has fallen. 
These views are redolent of Ohmae (1985) and Levitt (1983), 
but apply specifically to the food processing industry. The 
next section examines these propositions in some more 
detail. However, taken in conjunction with the decreasing 
importance of national laws, regulations, and tastes and the 
freeing up of capital markets (see.Rxhibit 3) we have an 
impressive a priori case for changes in structural 
conditions and a shift towards a more "European" industry. 
If indeed the structural conditions are changing in this way 
then we can expect a series of strategic adjustments by 
companies. Exhibit 2 illustrates the choices. The 
internationalisation of consumer segments is an autonomous 
and accelerating trend (by hypothesis) fostered further by 
the completion of the internal market. (Some) Companies 
will therefore be targeting more specific socio-economic 
groups and regions integrating their marketing across 
regions - in contrast with the majority of packaged goods 
multinationals who presently run their international 
operations as a portfolio of national strategies (Ramsay 
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1988). Alongside this new orientation to markets will be a 
new attitude to manufacturing. After a long period of 
diffusion of knowledge and experience a new wave of 
technology is beginning to appear. A number of different 
strands are visible. First, many manufacturers are 
searching for plants flexible enough for a wide product 
range so as to serve fragmenting markets. Others are 
looking for single scale efficient sourcing for European 
markets. Finally, there are those seeking for new products 
from the advent of new technologies (such as membrane 
separation in dairy products). 
Thus, in addition to market choices, there are significant 
manufacturing plant and product range choices to be made. 
Within this Ansoff-style product market matrix can b8 
encompassed the range of potential strategies, some new, 
some not so new. Alongside this matrix in Exhibit 2 are 
listed some of the possible routes by which this product- 
market positioning could be achieved. 
In our view there will be two main strands to the new 
evolutionary forms of the food industry. The first will be 
a restructuring, consolidation, efficiency-seeking change of 
the kind posted for the German beer industry. There will be 
a large reduction in numbers of plants and numbers of 
companies. There will be some simple closures and re- 
allocations of production within firms. There will be a 
spate of acquisitions of companies with distinctive assets 
such as brand names or distribution (but probably not 
manufacturing). Many small and smaller firms will be 
compelled to exit. The driving force in this scenario is 
the search for low cost through efficiency in production, 
distribution, and marketing. By itself this might not be so 
dramatic but for the strong possibility of new forms of 
competition based on new segmentation, branding, and new . 
products. So there will also be a premium on the 
rediscovery of marketing facilitated by joint ventures 
(products for markets, for example), and swaps of facilities 
to round out product lines and segment portfolios. The 
conjunction of efficiency seeking with marketing and product 
(and new technology as well?) innovation is likely to prove 
complex and highly disturbing. In the new structure as it 
stabilises there are likely to be many simultaneous 
strategic groups co-existing with some comfort. But in the 
evolution towards this there is likely to be a great deal of 
confusion and experimentation as Companies seek for new 
understandings and new positions. The next section looks in 
some more detail at the initial structure and some of the 
likely moves over the short term. 
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'I 3: THE EUROPEAN FOOD PROCESSING INDUSTRY : 
AN OVERVIEW ‘A, _,' ... -.______ ,- 
This section first provides a brief economic and statistical 
overview of selected key features of the European food 
processing industry. Secondly, it diSCUSS8S the pressures 
for change and their impact on the existing structure of the 
industry. 
3 - 1 Secto.K.s2GsLi&.o~.c~s 
Food processing is an industry containing a large number of 
sectors, encompassing a wide range of products and 
processes. A common breakdown (Nicholls, 1978) is into 
eleven segments as follows: 
breakfast cereals, bread and flour 
cakes and biscuits 
prOCeSSed meat 
processed fish 
dairy products 
sugar 
ChOCOlat8 and sugar confectionery 
processed fruit and Vegetables 
- non-alcoholic beverages 
other food products 
alcoholic drinks 
Across these sectors the food industry contains three types 
of firms: agricultural suppliers; "primary" processors, 
who turn crops into usable food products such as sugar or 
flour; and "s8condary" processors who produce avery kind of 
refined food product from ice-cream to sausages. 
these three types of companies make up the biggest 
Together 
manufacturing industry in the EC. This paper concentrates 
mainly on the "secondary" processors, the diversified food 
product companies. 
With the changes now in progress in the EC's regulatory 
structure, the very considerable effect of the CAP (Common 
Agricultural Policy) on the European food industry both in 
terms of raw material prices and terms and conditions of 
trade in processed food products, is likely to be tackled at 
last, albeit very slowly. The CAP has raised the price both 
of the European food industry's inputs and of its sales. 
Unlike the guaranteed prices (MCA's - Monetary Compensation 
Amounts) paid to most primary processors, the secondary 
processors must pass high input@Ae;Zto consumers and are not 
allowed to use Cheaper foreign farm products. High input 
prices must be expected to affect demand for prOC8SS8d foods 
(e.g. ready-made cakes), since they are discretionary 
purchases. Therefore a longer-term outlook for smaller 
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output and lower prices in the farming and primary sectors 
as a result of CAP reform, 
for secondary processors. 
creates an improved cost position 
Long-term technical advance and 
agricultural productivity have generated increases of 1.5% 
to 2.0% per year over the last 25 years, while consumption 
has increased by only about 0.5% per year in the same period 
(Swinbank and Burns, 1984). In real terms, average 
expenditure on food for Europe as a whole was only 7.3% 
higher in 1986 than in 1975 (Financial Times/GIRA, 1988) 
whilst in the richer EC economies such as West Germany, 
Netherlands and UK, the proportion of income spent on food 
is declining (Table 2). 
1970 23 
1975 19.8 
1978 17.9 
1981 15.5 
1986 13.8 
*Source: MAFF, Annual Food Statistics 
Lower input prices combined with changes in demand towards 
higher value-added products, 
within a mature industry. 
should help to provide growth 
It is processed rather than basic 
food products which are the growth segments, with three 
dominant forces driving demand - healthy eating, indulgence 
and convenience. The more pragmatic approach to standards 
being taken since 1985 (based on "mutual recognition" rather 
than "harmonisation") to dismantle technical non-tariff 
barriers to trade across EC boundaries, should also have a 
positive effect on growth in EC-wide consumption of . 
processed food products. From a variety of such non-tariff 
barriers, MAC estimated the most benefit to the European 
food and drinks industry "on the order of 2-38 of total 
industry value-added" (MAC 1987) would be derived from the 
removal of just six types: 
restrictions on the use of vegetable fat in 
chocolate 
restrictions on the use of vegetable fat in 
ice cream 
restrictions of the use of plastic containers 
limits on the alcohol content of beers 
beer purity laws 
pasta purity laws 
This is roughly equivalent to the claims made by the 
European Commission where the gains to EC nations from the 
removal of barriers to trade and production is estimated at 
12 
between 2.2-2.7% of total GDP (Cecchini, 1988; European 
Commission, 1988). 
3 . 2 The maiorr~eancompet~~ors 
Although the industry is commonly regarded as structurally 
fragmented, the structure varies enormously between 
countries and product sectors. For example, in the UK, 80% 
of beer comes from 7 breweries and 62% of biscuits from 2 
companies. By comparison West Germany had 10 times as many 
breweries and 7 times as many bakeries (Swinbank and Burns 
1984). However, productivity has traditionally been higher 
in the smaller German plants than the larger UK operations 
because of prolonged poor levels of investment. 
There are also a great number of small firms, e.g. the UK 
has 5,000+ firms with less than 200 employees, but the large 
mass of small companies make only a small contribution to 
total output. Many of the large firms in this industry are 
diversified not only across several sectors of the food and 
drink industry, but also into related service industries 
such as restaurants and hotels. 
product, 
These companies are multi- 
multi-process and multi-business. 
capital-intensive and technology-dependent. 
They are 
Table 3 Major European food companies (by turnover) 
(see end of text) 
IGD's enumeration of the largest food processors in Europe 
shows the remarkable domination (in size terms) by UK 
companies. Our own estimates support this (see Table 
below) showing 38 UK companies in the top 100, and 26 in the 
top 50. 
Table 4 Lamm%-&od Compa~-~ssi.~.-._E_U-~O~~ 
In top 10-Q L_n top 5Q In-&x? ____ 2.Q 
UK 38 26 14 
France 20 9 4 
Holland 12 7 
W. Germany 11 4 ' t 
* Source: authors estimates IGD 
3.3 Condu.ct and Performance 
Although recently leading firms have not shown significant 
gains in specific markets, their overall strength and 
opportunities for firm-level economies - e.g. in 
advertising, R & D, information and marketing - may have 
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increased. cross-subsidisation of products in markets where 
competition comes from smaller rivals can often mean that 
the firm with the "longest purse" may eventually secure 
market dominance (Burns, McInery and Swinbank, 1983). 
Similarly, it is commonly held that the major consequence of 
increased retailer buying power has been pressure on 
manufacturers' profits. Yet despite large food processors 
being squeezed between high EC-policy-induced raw material 
prices and very strong bargaining power by the retailers at 
the distribution end, margins are recovering and currently 
improving. 
Table 5 Nst~~~zof it-mar_s.in-e--B_r U . K . fctur i n q end 
~~~-~-~~s_%_s.a~~~~-.--- _.____ -.- _- __._ -_ historic cos~~.cuy_rent~.~c.ost 
Food manufacturing 
(a> (b) 
Food retailing 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
5.2 3.9(-0.6) 3.6 
6.0 4.2 (0.1) 3.3 
5.3 4.6 (0.4) 3.9 
5.0 4.0 (1.1) 3.1 
4.7 4.4 (1.3) 3.0 
44:: (2.6) ::i :i::; 33:: (2.5) 
4.2 (2.6) 4.8 (2.5) 3.1 (2.7) 
4.3 (2.8) 4.9 (2.8) 3.4 (2.8) 
(a) Source: Bank of England/Datastream 
(b) Source: Institute of Grocery Distribution 
* Source: OFT 1985, Table 15 
However, U.K. statistics suggest that investment is not 
increasing much, if at all, and that R & D has fallen 
significantly 
. 
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Table 6 Investment expenditures ____.____ --...-~lfi_x.ed ..c ap..i ta 1 
expenditures as % of Previous year's_.&.r.oss- 
capi.wL.s._t 0 c k. 1. 
!E!neiLe!eien.9dom 
1976 3.6 
1977 3.8 
1978 4.0 
1979 4.0 
1980 3.4 
1981 2.5 
1982 2.4 
1983 2.4 
1984 2.7 
All Food 
manufacturing Retail manufacturing distribution 
3.9 
4.6 
4.7 
4.6 
ii:: 
3.7 
3.4 
3.9 
5.3 
5.9 
6.2 
6.7 
5.7 
5.1 
5.0 
5.5 
6.1 
* Source: OFT 1985, Table 16 
Table 7 R & D expenditures bYPrivatei.n.d.~~.t-ry 
(U.K.) (fm. 1975) 
All manufacturing Food, drink & tobacco 
1972 1,257 
1975 
42.1 
1,172 
1978 
47.7 
1,373 
1981 
52.3 
1,420 
1983 
36.6 
1,330 27.0 
* SourcE: OFT 1985, Table 17 
The industry is characterised by economies of scale in 
manufacturing, high levels of fixed costs arising from R&D, 
marketing (especially advertising) and distribution. 
added ranges from 45% to 65%. 
Value 
(Tables 8 and 9 illustrate). 
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Table 8 Averasecosr_-_s.~~~~re_of 
PTodUc.t_S-S.L9.7~.~.1 
man.uuactuse-d,-. food 
fl.OO Manufacturers' selling price 
.04 
:05 11 
:10 15 
. 55 
Profit 
Other costs 
Distribution 
Labour 
Pacakaging 
Raw materials 
* Source: Food Manufacturers Association/Jordans, 1985 
Table 9 Cost structure for a standard (255)-~ac,ke& 
ofpotat.oc-rL.sgs 
. 09 
:18 05 
:15 8 
. 35 
Profit 
Advertising and promotion 
Distribution and marketing 
Manufacturing and labour 
Packaging 
Raw materials 
* Source: Vickers da Costa Research/Jordans, 1985 
Over the lo-year period 1973-83 raw materials costs have 
fallen from an average of 51.9% to 43.9%. reflecting the 
general increase in value-added in the industry. 
The importance of brands in the food industry cannot be 
overemphasised. National branding is the traditional source 
of competitive advantage and brand share is commonly 
associated with superior profitability (see below). The size 
of national retailers (in the UK at least) has substantially 
eroded the strength of many, but not all, brands, replacing 
product branding with their own form of outlet branding 
(private labelling). However this is more evident in the UK 
than elsewhere. In general, manufacturers' brands remain 
significant, but are focussed on national markets. For 
example, IGD calculates that there were 22 food 
manufacturers in the top 100 advertisers in the UK in 1987. 
Their total advertising spend is estimated at f344 million 
and increasing. 
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Table 10 
*Sourse: 
R_e~_r_n__qn_~jnv_estmsntfoy_d~.fferenf brand 
~9s it i 0 n s 
Brand rank 
1 
2 
3 
4 
PIMS Database 
ROT 
18% 
3% 
-1% 
-6% 
The MAC report (1987) shows that out of a sample of 46 EC- 
based food companies, 
countries or less. 
one-half have a presence in two EC 
Table 11 A~~~~~iiorcountriesperProd_u_c_t.--ljnefor 
Z.CEkx-s5z-d ..smma Us. 
1 country 6% 
l/2 countries 44% 
2/3 countries 24% 
3/4 countries 17% 
> 4 countries 9% 
*Source: The MAC GROUP, 1987 
Building the geographic coverage.of key brands is held to be 
of increasing competitive significance. It lies behind the 
pattern of acquisitions, disposals and "swaps" which is well 
advanced amongst US food companies and strongly under way in 
Europe. As indicated by the table below, the US food 
companies are significantly further advanced than the 
Europeans in both brand strength and geographic coverage, 
whilst the Swiss are significantly stronger in geographic 
coverage, 
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Table 12 &and strength/seosranhic coverage for 
EC v. non-EC-based companies 
1 Brand strength 1 
60 % 
40% 
20 % 
m” us CH 
EEC I A 
0 
1 Geographic 1 
20% 04% 60 % 80 % 100 % coverage 
Acquisitions and Mergers 
In the UK, the number of acquisitions in the economy rose 
substantially in 1987 (50% up on 1980). f15.4bn was spent 
on 1,125 acquisitions in 1987 (in 1986 - E14.9bn on 
acquisitions). 
definitions, 
According to (narrow) Government 
in food manufacturing the value of acquisitions 
was f449mn from 36 companies in 1987 (compared to f356mn . 
from 45 in 1986). IGD taking a wider definition counted 78 
acquisitions made by 34 companies in the period January 87 
to March 88, with a value of f719mn (see Appendix 1). 
At the start of the 198Os, there was a major burst of 
acquisitions and expansion into North America. The USA 
still remains the single most popular area with 15 of 39 
foreign acquisitions recorded there (see Figure 1). However 
in the last fifteen months half of all foreign acquisitions 
by UK food manufacturers were in Europe. (See Appendix 2). 
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Figure 1 Origins of Foreisn Companies Acquired bv UK 
Food Manufacturey_s_ 
/ AUS 
USA 
CAN 
HOLL 
FAA 
EIRE 1 
*Source: IGD Research 
. 
Of prime significance are the megabids (see Appendix 2) i.e. 
acquisitions of over $lbn (Table 13). 
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Table 13 Recent major acquisitions over J lbn 
Year Acquiring Country Sector Target Country Sector Price 
Company Company Sm. 
1984 BeetriceFaxk USA 
1984 Nestle 
1985 RJReymM 
1985 Philip Morris USA 
1985 HansonTrust 
1986 Ouinness 
1986 Allied-Lyons 
1986 CocaCola 
1986 QcacOla 
1988 Nestle 
Swiss 
USA 
UK 
UK 
UK 
USA 
USA 
Diversified &mark UsA 
faodp&3. 
Diversified Carnation USA 
fadprod% 
Tobaax Nabisco US4 
Tobrrxx, Oenaral USA 
Foods 
Diversified Imperial UK 
P- (-UP 
Bowing Distillers UK 
Diversified Hiram UK 
faX3prods. 
Wtdrinks BCIHoldifqp USA 
S&drinks JTLCorp. USA 
Dlvartiflad Rowntree UK 
foodprak 
Divmified 
foodprak 
Dairy/div. 
foadpr& 
Bfscuits/ 
cunnedf&s 
Diversified 
foaJpra& 
Food& 
tom 
Spirits 
Spirits 
2840 
3000 
4907 
4750 
2800 
3481 
1860 
BtlttleF 
Bottler 
cmoiate 
confect 
1000 
1400 
3650 
Apart from the mega-bids listed,-well over 100 other major 
mergers have occurred in the sector valued at $50m or more, 
between European firms, US firms and across both. A recent 
example of this level of restructuring is the takeover of 
Freshbake Foods (UK frozen foods) by Campbell Soup Co. (US) 
for E109m in 1988. The extent of the continued 
restructuring, rationalisation and Euro-bids from large US 
food companies, can only lend force to the view that their 
current dominant positions in many segments will only be 
reinforced by more open access to markets and further 
economies of scale. 
The pace of acquisition pre-1992 suggests concerns to gain 
critical mass appropriate to the extension of markets beyond 
national boundaries. Simultaneously there is evidence of 
corporate restructuring as disposals have become noticeable 
in some large companies (e.g. Unilever, Fitch Lovell, ABF, 
Cadbury Schweppes). Appendix 3 highlights recent disposals. 
Management buy-outs are also increasing rapidly. Recent 
buy-outs in food manufacturing are listed in Appendix 4. 
The Pressure Points for Change 
EC companies are beginning to restructure to create units of 
sufficient size to compete with the major US and Swiss 
companies. While it is apparent that most parts of the EC 
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food industry, 
sector, 
and especially the secondary processing 
have recently undergone rapid structural development 
and increasing concentration, in all countries a wide range 
of firm and plant size continues to exist (Swinbank and 
Burns, 1984). 
"Removing trade barriers is a necessary though 
insufficient condition . . . for ensuring the continued 
competitiveness on a global scale of the EC food 
industry" (MAC, 1987) 
The MAC Report (1987) argues strongly that the existence of 
trade barriers (especially non-tariff barriers) has served 
to protect relatively weak domestic food processing 
companies and, more importantly, has had the effect of 
encouraging strong companies to expand domestically rather 
than across European borders. Thus trade barriers have 
reinforced the relative fragmentation of the EC food 
industry compared to their major internatioanl rivals. The 
Economist Survey (1988) reached broadly the same conclusion, 
that although a reduction in the frictions of the European 
markets will make competition from non-European 
multinationals stiffer: 
II 
. , . it may sap their relative advantage. 
till now, 
They have, 
been able to exploit big company efficiencies 
against fragmented competition in a fragmented Europe: 
that position of relative superiority will be 
undermined." 
The comparison drawn by MAC is with the process of 
restructuring and rationalisation already observable in the 
world food industry, but more particularly with the 
precedent set by the pattern of consolidations in the US 
food industry. The US companies have been focusing on 
achieving nationwide brand dominance but with restricted 
product range. To this end they have been pruning their 
product portfolios and achieving both dominant market share, 
geographic coverage and hence higher profitability, in the 
selected product areas. The US food industry in the last 
five years has therefore been characterised not just by 
acquisitions in the related product areas, but also by 
mutual "swaps" of business units. EC food companies do not, 
as yet, follow a similarly EC-wide strategy. As the MAC 
data shows, they are relatively nationally (i.e. regionally 
in EC terms) focused. 
The pressure for change, as well as the direction it should 
take, are therefore clear. Product portfolios, brand 
strengths and range of geographic coverage need to be 
reviewed, not least to be able to match the cost structure 
and margins of the major US competitors. Although national 
differences in taste, culture, language and distribution 
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systems have all contributed to the relative fragmentation 
of the European food industry, trade barriers and 
governmental protectionism have tended to reinforce rather 
than modify their effect. Post-1992, it is those EC-based 
food companies able and willing to undertake sich a 
restructuring that will be (arguably) in the strongest 
position to compete with their US and Swiss rivals. They 
start from a considerable disadvantage since non-EC-based 
companies currently control almost half the strong brand 
positions within major EC markets and control over 60% of 
total food industry equity (MAC, 1987). 
What is being advocated here is a simple reassessment in 
terms of the traditional Ansoff product/market matrix in 
response to a changed compet;tive environment. 
Traditionally, for the reasons mentioned above, EC food 
companies have tended to diversify into new product areas 
within their domestic market, rather than extending their 
existing (or new growth) product sectors into a larger 
number of EC markets. 
One interesting aspect of this strategy is that it does 
avoid the mistakes made in the international restructuring 
following the deregulation of the financial services 
industry, where even the biggest and best-capitalised banks 
and securities houses failed to become international 
financial supermarkets. The lesson learned seems 
suppi'ort the recommended strategy of international 
to 
specialisation in selected product areas. 
A major assumption underpinning this strategy is the 
existence of European-wide market segments susceptible to 
international branding. The logic behind restructuring is 
the establishment of dominant brands in international market 
segments. The thinking behind "swaps" and related 
acquisitions is the creation of specialised brand portfolios 
. 
in selected product ranges. The process has already begun 
with food processing capacity being concentrated in the 
hands of fewer, more efficient firms. 
*** 
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Table 3 Top Food Companies in Europe ,. . . me 
Market Capitalisation - 
Mid May 1988 
I 
1. Unilever Plc/NV (UK/Netn) f3574.2 m 
2. Nestle (Swi) SFrl8 bn 
3. BSN Group Fra) FFr22.1 bn I 
4. Jacobs Suchard (Swi) SFr301 m 
5. Cadbury Schweppes (UK) 
/ 
f1959.1 m 
6. Rowntree (UK) f 1896.5 m 
7. Associated British Foods (UK) f 1256.4 m 
J 8. Hillsdown Holdings f1135.3 m t 
9. United Biscuits (UK) fl118.8m I 
10. Rank Hovis McDougall (UK) f 1042.0 m 
11. Unigate (UK) f684.3 m 
1 12. Northern Foods f660.3 m 
13. Dalgety (UK) ~ f 653.8 m 
t4. Tate & Lyle (UK) f582.8 m 
15. 5 & W Berisford 
I 6. Saint Louis Grouo 
(UK) f569.5 m I _ 
(Fra) FFrS.7 bn 
1 17. Pertier, Source FFrS.4 bn I 
18. Booker (UK) f502.3 m 
19. Beghin - SA IF@ FFr4.5 bn 
20. Hazlewood Foods (UK) f426.2 m I 
2 I. Bonqrain (Fra) FFr3.5 bn 
I 22. Wessanen (Neth) Ofll bn I 
NOTE: Companies that have 70% or more of theiiequity held by one other concern 
or that have only a minimal proportion of their capital openly traded on thi 
stock market are exduded. 
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decent UK Acquisitions by UK Companies 
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Recent UK Acquisitions by UK Companies 
i+Pa-i-i+ \ ‘, ~ 2 
Recent UK Acquisitions by UK Companies 
A?P- CNb\X a.. \ 
Foreign Acquisition by UK Companies 
- I 
, 
Buyer 
L 
Appletree 
J. Bibby 
I 
Bio Isolates 
I 
Cadbury 
Cadbury 
Cadbury 
I 
Oalgety 
Oalgety 
A. Fisher 
A. Fisher 
A. Fisher 
Value 
f 17.9m 
f2 1.4m 
N/A 
f95m 
f3m 
f9.84m 
f17m 
f3.7m 
f1.8m 
f 15.4m 
f 4.194m 
, 
Acquired Market Country 
Kildare Chilling 
I 
Meat Eire 
+ Meats 
Nelles Griot 
A 
Optics USA 
Le Sueur Isolates Milk France 
Chocolat Poulain Confec France 
Red Cheek S.&ink USA 
Taylor Foods S.Drin k USA 
Pteservenbedrijf Miscel Holland 
Mor - Green F&V USA 
, 
Scalisi Produce F&V USA 
Lee Ray Tarantino F&V USA 
Reingold BV F&V Holland 
Hazlewood Foods 1 f774,527 
Hatlewood Foods f 4.18m 
&zlewood Foods f4.67m 
r 
Hatlewood Foods f 4.7m 
, 
Hatlewood Foods f 9.2Sm , 
Associated Biscuits Bread W. Germany 
Fri D’or Frozen Holland 
Wafel Janaen Miscel Holland 
Evers General Holland 
HE8 General Holland 
Foreign Acquisition by UK Companies 
Buyer Value 
Hillsdown f 169m 
Hillsdown N/A 
Hillsdown N/A 
Northumbrian F.F f750,OOO 
R.H.M. f 15.9m 
Rowntree N/A 
Rowntree N/A 
Rowntree f4.8m 
C. Salvesen N/A 
C. Salvesen flt9m 
Acquired 
Maple Leaf 
B&F Produce 
Blades Group 
Fi bersund 
National Preserve 
co. 
Norgen Vaaz 
Candice Martial 
Gorant Candies 
Agro GMBH 
Mobileair 
Market 
Bread 
F&V 
Fish 
General 
Miscel 
Confec 
Confec 
Confec 
F. Ok&b 
Freezer 
Equipment 
, 
Country 
Canada 
Holland 
Canada 
Denmark 
USA 
Australia 
France 
. 
USA 
W. Germany 
m 
USA 
C. Salvesen Jf13.4m 1 Langnese lglo 1 F.Dirtb } W. Germany r 
C. Salvesen 
C. Salvesen 
Unilever 
N/A 
f 459,375 
N/A 
1 1 I 
Deges F.Distb W. Germany ’ 
Pierce Industrial Air Machinery USA 
1 Celestial Seasoning Miscel USA 
Unilever 1 N/A 1 Indurtries Revilla 1 Meat 
Unilever 
Unilever 
f 2094.6m 
f81.2m 
;;;Tsboroug h. 
Bushells Hldgs 
.Toiletries 
zYe 
. 
. 
USA 
Australia 
14 Companies 1 f3445.65m I39 Companies I I 
Divestments of Selected Companies 1986/l 987 
Disposed Business Activity Location Approx. 
Consideration 
Cadbury Schweppes 
Beverage & Food Divn. Groceries UK f97m 
Cadbury Siotts (75%) Confectionery Sweden f4.5m 
Oasis industries (40%) Bottler New Zealand $26m 
Confectionery Canada Cf47m 
Fitch Lovcil 
Machin & Kingsley Building & Materials UK f0.65m 
Distributor 
Joseph Stocks Divn. Traditional & Whole - UK f3m 
Sale Bacon Operation 
Northern Foods UK 
Northern Dairies - Liquid milk UK f6m 
Hereford/Folkestone 
Tates Supermarkets UK f 3.7m 
Goldrei Foucard & Son Bakers Sundries Cakes UK fll.lm 
and Turner Bros. Mixes & Ingredients 
Keystone Equity Group McDonalds Meat USA US f66m 
Products & Distribution 
Unilever 
Thames Case Corrugated solid cases UK N/A 
& Boxes 
Three Oil Mills Oil Milling Neth. & N/A 
Germany 
Europower Hydraulics & Engineering UK f3.lm 
EH Fluid Connecton 
Massey International Vehicle Body UK N/A 
Coach builden Manufacture 
Research international Market Research UK N/A 
Group 
Thamesboard Paper/Packaging UK f8Om 
Stauffef Chemicals USA f16m 
.. Recent Management Buyouts in the Food Sector. - .., : - . .- - . 
Name of Company Seller Price Activity ‘:: 
., 
Jeyes Cadbury Schweppes f 19m Hygiene 
‘1 - 
I 
Premier Brands Cadbury Schweppes f97m Food & Beverages 
, ‘i 
b . 
Southern Belle Northern Foods C. 35m Meat (USA) -4 v.. 
Mosspack l.E.England & Sons f 27,000 Potatoes -- -.- 
Furniss of Cornwall Argyll Group N/A Biscuits 
, Gold Crown Foods . Argyll Group , N/PI , Coffee . 
K & K Greeff 1 Dalgety 1 f8.2m [ Chemicals 1 
(Balfour Guthrie 1 Dalgety 1 f7Sm 1 Lumber (Canada) 1 1 
1 I 1  
John Perkins Meat I Management Buy-In I N/A I Meat Processing I 
I Associated Fresh I ASDA I f65m I Dairy Foods - Dairv Divn. I 
Source : IGD Research 
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